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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN W. MARTIN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 7731 
PAUL H. STEVENS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
FACTS 
We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the 
court below. 
The statement of facts set forth in appellant's brief 
is substantially correct, but we desire to make the follow-
ing comments : 
At the bottom of page 1 of plaintiff's brief, it is 
stated that plaintiff looked to the east and saw that it was 
clear and then proceeded into the intersection. Although 
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the plaintiff testified that he looked to the east it is mani-
fest that it was not clear. From the testimony of plain-
tiff's own witness, Lawrence B. Rogers, an engineer, and 
from plaintiff's Exhibit D, it is determinable that at a 
point 20 feet north of the south sidewalk on Stratford 
Avenue, the plaintiff had good vision to the east for a 
distance of 205 feet and at a point 15 feet north of the 
sidewalk, he had vision to the east to a distance of 465 
feet. After clearing the line of trees between the side-
walk and the road, he had an unobstructed and unlimited 
vision to the east. It follows therefore, that either the 
plaintiff failed to look at all to the east at any point in 
his line of travel where he would have a good view to the 
east, or else, having looked to the east failed to take heed 
of the defendant's approaching automobile. 
It is also stated in plaintiff's brief that plaintiff's 
automobile was knocked west on Stratford Avenue o:ver 
two front yards and a hedge, coming to a rest at a dis-
tance of 156 feet from the point of impact. While it ap-
pears that plaintiff's car came to rest 156 feet from the 
point of impact, there is absolutely no evidence whatso-
ever to warrant the conclusion that it was knocked that 
distance by the. force of defendant's automobile striking 
it. It is at least equally probable that plaintiff's car 
traveled this distance under its own power while out 
of the control of the plaintiff who was knocked uncon-
cious in the collision. 
Plaintiff has failed to mention the testimony of plain-
tiff himself, that he traveled at least 20 feet south on 18th 
East Street with a clear view to the east, and by his own 
testimony he could stop within a distance of five feet 
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at the rate of speed at 'Yhich he 'Yns traveling. (R. 48, 
49). By his o'Yn testilnony he never sa'v the defendant's 
car until he heard its brakes squeal, 'vhich would have 
been 'vhen it 'Yas no further than 57 feet away (R. 42), 
and he admitted that he might have told the defendant 
that he never did see him. (R. 51). Plaintiff has also failed 
to mention in his brief the testin1ony of Harold Peterson 
the investigating police officer who testified that at the 
time he investigated the accident, immediately after its 
occurrence, that the plaintiff admitted to him; that he 
never did see the defendant's car. (R. 86). The testimony 
of Officer Peterson was not contradicted or rebutted by 
the testimony of any other witness and Officer Peterson 
having been called by the plaintiff and being a disinter-
ested witness, the plaintiff is bound by his testimony. 
The plaintiff's own testimony, and that of the witnesses 
called by him, clearly established that the accident was 
caused, at least in part, by the plaintiff's own failure to 
keep a proper look-out 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE SHOWED CONCLU-
SIVELY AND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH WAS A SUBSTANTIAL PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT AND THE INJURIES AND DAMAGES SUS-
TAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
Since the decision of this Court in the case of Bullock 
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v. Luke, 98 Pac. (2d) 350, rendered on January 22, 1940, 
this court has decided a number of cases involving the 
respective rights, duties and liabilities of the parties to 
an intersection collision. We have carefully examined all 
of the cases which we have been able to discover from 
this court which deal with that question, in an attempt to 
determine the rules applicable to the drivers involved in 
intersection collisions. 
From our study of the decisions we believe that the 
following rules are deducible and may be said to be the 
established law of this state. 
1. Regardless of which driver technically has the 
right of way, both drivers have the duty to exercise vigi-
lance for other traffic which may be approaching or enter-
ing the intersection, and failure to exercise that duty is 
negligence as a matter of law. If that principle had not 
been previously established it was definitely laid do·wn 
as the law of this state in Bullock v. Luke, supra. We find 
no dissent from that proposition in any of the cases sub-
sequently decided by this court; it has been reiterated 
in most of the decisions subsequent to the Bullock case, 
and in the most recent expression of opinion, we find 
the principle reaffirmed. This Court speaking through 
Mr. Justice Wade in the case of Lowder v. Holley, 233 
P. (2d) 350 said: 
"Appellants are correct in stating that before 
entering an inte-rsection the driver of a car 1nust 
look and determine whether it is safe to enter." 
We do not understand that plaintiff questions this 
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rule, and \Ye mention it here merely for the purpose of 
developing our argument. 
2. In most situations both parties to an intersec-
tion collision are guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
In making this assertion, \Ye are fully mindful of the de-
cisions of this court in the cases of llf artin v. Sheffield, 
112l~t. 478, 189 Pac. (2d) 127; Hess v. Robinson, 109 Ut. 
60, 163 P. (:2d) 510 and Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. (2d) 
350. We think it requires no extended argument to show 
that in the case of Bullock v. Luke, supra; Sine v. Salt 
Lake Transportation Co., 147 Pac. (2d) 875; Hickok v. 
Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514; Conklin v. Walsh, 
113 Ut. 276, 193 Pac. (2d) 437; and Gren v. Norton, 213 
Pac. (2d) 356, it was held that both of the drivers in-
volved in the intersection collisions in those cases were 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. In each of those 
cases it was further held that the negligence of the plain-
tiff was a proximate cause of the accident and in each 
case he was denied recovery. 
In the cases of Martin v. Sheffield, Hess v. Robinson 
and Lowder v. Holley, there is language which somewhat 
indicates that the question of the. plaintiff's negligence 
was for the trier of fact. However, we be·lieve that a care-
ful study of the opinions of this court in those cases will 
reveal that the true. holding was that the question re-
served for the trier of fact was not whether or not the 
plaintiff was guilty of negligence, but whether or not the 
negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of his 
injuries. 
In Hess v. Robinson, the plaintiff was proceeding 
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southerly on an arterial street in Ogden. Streets inter-
. secting with the street on which he was driving were stop 
signed. The plaintiff failed to observe the defendant's 
ambulance approaching from his right, and the ambulance 
ran through the stop sign and into and against the plain-
tiff. The trial court held that both parties were guilty 
of negligence and specifically held that the plaintiff 
was negligent in failing to observe the appro~ch of the 
defendant's vehicle. However, the trial judge took the 
position that even though the plaintiff had observed the 
defendant's vehicle, he would have been justified in as-
suming that it would stop for the stop sign, and that 
therefore he was entitled to proceed into and through 
the intersection until it became apparent to him that the 
defendant would not respect his right of way. The court 
reasoned that by the time it became apparent to the plain-
tiff that the defendant would not obey the stop sign it 
might have been too late for the plaintiff to avert the 
accident, and therefore, it was for the jury to determine 
whether his failure to observe the defendant's automobile 
was a proximate or legal cause of the accident. The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff which 
was affirmed by this court. In the leading opinion, \vri t-
ten by Chief Justice Larson and concurred in by Justice 
Turner, the theory of the trial judge was followed. Jus-
tice Wade concurred in the result, saying that it was a 
jury question whether the plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence which proximately caused the injury. It is not 
altogether clear in the opinion of Justice Wade whether 
it was intended to hold that the question of negligence 
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\ras for the jury, or 1nerely 'vhether the question for 
the jury \\?as \vhether the negligence of the plaintiff was 
the proxin1ate cause of the accident. The implication 
fron1 his language as \ve understand it, is that the negli-
gence \vas recognized to exist and his concurrence \vas 
based on the vie'v that only the question of proximate 
cause \vas for the jury. Justice Wolfe concurred in the 
result on the theory that the question of negligence of 
the plaintiff, as well as the question of proximate cause 
was for the jury, and in this opinion 1\Ir. Justice Mc-
Donough concurred. 
\\T e are unable to harmonize the concurring opinion 
of Justice Wolfe with the rules laid down before and 
since. In his opinion he did not depart from the princi-
ple above stated, i.e. that both parties have a duty to 
observe for other traffic approaching or entering an in-
tersection. On the contrary he stated: "but we held it a 
salutary rule that one who had the right of way still has 
the duty not to exercise it if he did or could have as-
certained that another was not going to give it to him 
and that his insisting upon his right of way under those 
circumstances was contributory negligence." It was ad-
mitted in the case of Hess v. Robinson that the plaintiff 
did not see the defendant's appToaching vehicle, and we 
are therefore unable to understand how it can be said 
that it was a question for the trier of fact whether or not 
he was guilty of negligence. However, we are in full 
agreement with the view that the question of whether 
or not the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate 
cause of the accident was a question for the jury in that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
case, since the plaintiff was entitled to assume that the 
defendant would yield to him until it became apparent to 
the plaintiff that the defendant would not yield, which 
might have been too late for the plaintiff to avert the 
accident. 
In the case of Martin v. Sheffield, 189 Pac. (2d) 127, 
the plaintiff who had been traveling west on Wilson Ave-
nue, testified that she observed to her left when she was 
about 50 feet east of the intersection with Tenth East 
and that at the time she could see about 75 feet south of 
the intersection and that she saw no car approaching. 
She did not look again until after she was in the inter-
section and she did not observe the defendant's vehicle 
approaching until immediately before the accident. Al-
though there is language in the opinion of the court which 
indicates that the question of the plaintiff's negligence 
was for the jury, we think that the true holding of the 
court was that the question for the jury was whether the 
plaintiff's failure to look to the left at any time between 
the time she first observed and the time she entered the 
intersection was a proximate cause of the accident. This 
court, speaking through Mr. Justice McDonough said: 
"There was a conflict in the evidence as to her 
speed, as to the defendant's speed, and as to 
whether defendant stopped before the collision or 
stopped after the impact with plaintiff's car. 
These factors would all have bearing on whether 
failure of plaintiff to look to her left the instant 
she entered the intersection contributed to the acci-
dent or p;revertted her from stopping her car 
short of the point of impact or prevented her 
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from ttttrning to the right to avoid the collision." 
(Italics ours). 
The court further observed as follows: 
'•If reasonable minds might differ a.s to which 
version of events shall be believed, then reasonable 
minds might likewise differ as to whether plain-
tiff~s own conduct contributed to the accident." 
The fair purport of this language, as we under-
stand it, is that the question of proxin1ate cause was for 
the jury. To say that it was a question for the jury 
whether plaintiff \vas negligent in failing to keep a proper 
lookout, in the face of her admission that she looked 
only once before entering the intersection and did that 
when her field of vision was limited to a distance of 75 
feet and when she, herself, was about 50 feet from the 
intersection, would seem to fly squarely into the face 
of the apparently well established rule that· the plain-
tiff must keep a proper lookout for other automobiles 
entering the intersection and that such observation should 
be made at a point where observations will be reasonably 
efficient for, and conduce to protection. Bullock v. L1tke, 
supra. 
In the recent case of Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. (2d) 
350, the plaintiff failed to observe the defendant's vehicle 
approaching from the plaintiff's right. However, in that 
case there was evidence from which the court could find 
that at the time the plaintiff entered the intersection, 
the defendant was at least 250 feet away, and that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to assume that the defendant 
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would yield the right of way to him, and therefore, his 
failure to observe the, defendant's approaching vehicle 
was not a proximate cause of the accident. We are un-
able to harmonize the holding of the court in this case with 
the holdings of the court in Hickok v. Skinner, supra; 
Conklin v. Walsh, supra; and Gren v. Norton, supra, 
wherein it was held that not only does the driver have a 
duty to make observations before entering the intersec-
tion, but also to reobserve and to reappraise as he pro-
ceeds through the intersection. Whether or not it was 
the intent of the court to overrule or modify those cases, 
we do not know. Neither does it particularly matter so 
far as the result of this case is concerned. We find noth-
ing in Lowder v. Holley which is inconsistent with the 
earlier cases of Bullock v. Luke and Sine v. Salt Lake 
Transportation Company, upon which we rely. We 
merely invite the court's attention to this matter to point 
out that the Lowder case leaves the law in a somewhat 
unsettled state that should be clarified when the matter is 
again presented to the court in an appropriate case. 
3. Under certain circumstances the question of 
whether the negligence of the party having the right of 
way was the cause of the accident would be a jury ques-
tion. 
We have heretofore reviewed the decisions of this 
court, observing that the question of proximate cause 
was held to be for the jury, in three of the decided cases. 
We are unable to deduce a general rule from those three 
decisions. Perhaps the best that can be said is that where, 
'under the facts of the particular case, reasonable minds 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
might conclude that the favored driver might have en-
tered the intersection, even though he had observed the 
approach of the defendant, \Yith the expectation that the 
defendant 'vould yield the right of 'vay to him, the ques-
tion of \vhether or not the plaintiff's negligence was a 
proximate cause of the accident must be for the trier of 
fact and not be determined by the court as a 1natter of 
law. Conversely, where the evidence is such that all 
reasonable minds would agree that the failure of the 
favored driver to observe the approach of the defend-
ant's automobile was a proximate cause of the accident, 
the plaintiff is precluded as a matter of law from recover-
mg. 
If we are correct in our interpretation of the deci-
sions of this court, there can be no doubt in this case 
that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law, under the general rule above stated that both 
drivers involved in an intersection collision are guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law. However, if we are mis-
taken in our unde-rstanding, and the rule is not so broad 
as we have above stated, we are still of the opinion that 
the facts and the evidence in this case compel a conclu-
sion that the plaintiff failed to exercise a prope-r look-
out or any lookout whatsoever, and he was therefore 
negligent as a matter of law. 
By his own admission the plaintiff never observed 
the defendant's automobile until after the defendant 
had applied his brakes, and it was the noise of the defend-
ant's squealing brakes that attracted plaintiff's attention 
to his approach. Thus the plaintiff never observed the 
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defendant until after the emergency had arisen and the 
defendant had already taken steps to avert or at least to 
1ninimize the effects of the impending accident. There 
is other evidence in the record and particularly the testi-
mony of Officer Peterson, that the plaintiff never did 
see the defendant. And the plaintiff himself admitted 
that he might have told the defendant that he never saw 
him. Plaintiff testified that he left only two feet of skid 
marks and that he could stop in a distance of less than 
five feet at the rate of speed at which he was traveling. 
It is apparent, therefore, that had the plaintiff observed 
the defendant's approach only a second before he did, 
this accident would have been averted. 
It is mathematically demonstrable that during the 
last 43¥2 to 48¥2 feet of plaintiff's course along 18th East 
Street, the defendant's approaching automobile was with-
in his field of vision. 
At a point 20 feet north of the south edge of the side-
walk on the north side of Stratford Avenue, plaintiff 
would have a field of vision for a distance of 205 feet east 
of the intersection (more. than 218 feet east of the point 
of impact). At this point the plaintiff would be 48lh 
feet from the point of impact. This distance is calculated 
as follows: 20 feet from the point of observation to the 
south edge of the sidewalk, plus 12¥2 feet from the edge 
of the sidewalk to the edge of the hard surfaced portion 
of Stratford Avenue plus 14 feet from the edge of the 
hard surfaced portion of the road to the center line of the 
road plus 2 feet (22 inches) from the center of the road 
to the northern-most skid marks left by the defendant's 
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auton1obile. These distances are taken from the plain-
tiff's Exhibits C and D and from the testimony of the 
plaintiff. 
Taking the evidence in the light n1ost favorable to 
the plaintiff, as "\Ve must in this case, let it be assumed 
that the plaintiff "\vas traveling at a rate of speed of 10 
miles per hour, ( 15 feet per second) the lowest speed 
at "~hich he testified to traveling. At that rate of speed 
plaintiff would require about three seconds to travel 
from a point 20 feet north of the intersection to the point 
of impact. If the defendant was traveling at a speed of 
30 miles per hour ( 44 feet per second), he would at the 
time when plaintiff was 20 feet north of the intersection 
be 132 feet east of the· point of impact; at 35 miles per 
hour or 51 feet per second he would be 153 feet east of 
the point of impact; at 40 miles per hour or 59 feet per 
second he would be 177 feet east of the point of impact; 
at 45 miles per hour or 66 feet per second he would be 198 
feet east of the point of impact and at 50 miles per hour 
or 74 feet per second he would be 222 feet east of the point 
of impact (about 209 feet east of the intersection). All 
of the above calculations are based upon the assumption 
that the defendant traveled at a constant rate of speed up 
to the point of impact. However, it is undisputed that 
for at least the last 57 feet prior to the moment of im-
pact, the defendant was decelerating, so that at the vari-
ous speeds assumed he would have been several feet closer 
to the point of impact, than indicated in the calculations. 
It is thus obvious and not open to dispute that if the de-
fendant were traveling at any rate of speed up to 50 
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miles per hour, he was within the plaintiff's field of vi-
sion at all times after the plaintiff was within 48lf2 feet 
of the point of impact. 
As plaintiff proceeded southerly from a point 20 feet 
north of the intersection his field of vision rapidly ex-
panded. At a distance only five feet further to the south, 
that is at a point 15 feet north of the intersection, his field 
of vision had had n1ore than doubled and had increased to 
a distance of 465 feet east of the intersection. From this 
point the defendant's automobile would have been within 
plaintiff's field of vision even had defendant been travel-
ing at a rate of 100 miles per hour. 
Of course, there is no evidence in the record what-
soever to warrant a finding that defendant was travel-
ing at a rate of speed greatly in excess of 32 miles per 
hour. Officer Farnsworth testified that skid marks 57 
feet in length would indicate that the defendant was 
traveling about 32 miles per hour. Since he had not come 
to a full stop at the end of the skid marks he would have 
been going somewhat faster than 32 miles per hour but 
as to how much faster there is no evidence whatsoever 
in the record. We are unable to find any evidentiary 
basis for planitiff's suggestion that the defendant was 
traveling 45 to 55 miles per hour. However, if he were 
traveling at that speed, as claimed by the plaintiff, de-
fendant was within the plaintiff's field of vision for at 
least the last 43~ feet of his progress toward the point 
of impact, and if he was traveling at that rate of speed 
it would be fair notice to the plaintiff that the defend-
ant had no intention of yielding the right of way to hi1n. 
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Plaintiff testified that he could stop in a distance 
of le~s than fiYe feet at the rate of speed at 'vhich he 
was traveling. On his O"\Yn testimony, therefore, he could 
haYe aYerted the accident had he observed the defend-
ant's car at any time before he "\Yas within 5 feet of the 
point of impact. Under these circumstances the conclu-
sion appears to us inescapable that not only was the 
plaintiff guilty of negligence but that that negligence con-
tributed substantially, directly and proximately to the 
accident and to its lmfortunate consequences to the plain-
tiff. We believe that this case falls squarely within the 
principles of Bullock v. Luke and s·ine v. Salt Lake Trans-
portation Co. and not within the principles of Hess v. 
Robinson, Jfartin v. Sheffield and ·Lowder v. Holley. 
The facts of this case directly parallel those in Bul-
lock v. Luke. In both cases the accident occurred early 
in the morning, in broad daylight, on dry roads, and with 
good visibility. In both cases the plaintiff was the driver 
on the right and therefore technically entitled to the right 
· ·of way. In Bullock v. L1tke, under the evidence most 
favorable to him, the plaintiff failed to observe the de-
fendant's approaching vehicle until he (plaintiff) was 
20 feet south of the intersection line, notwithstanding that 
he had a view of 200 feet to the west when he was 60 feet 
south of the intersection line and 800 feet to the west when 
he was 20 feet south of the intersection line. In the in-
stant case, the facts make an even stronger case of contri-
butory negligence. Here the plaintiff failed to observe 
the defendant until the plaintiff was actually within the 
intersection, notwithstanding the fact that he had a view 
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of 205 feet to the east at a point 20 feet north of the inter-
section and 465 feet to the east when he was 15 feet from 
the intersection and he was traveling at a rate of speed 
of less than half of that of the plaintiff in the Bullock 
case, and thus had greater opportunity to make observa-
tions. The language of this court in Bullock v. Luke 
would seem to be applicable with equal force to the case 
at bar. It was there said : 
"At 20 feet south of that line, he could have 
seen 800 feet west. Why, then, didn't he see Luke 
before the time claimed by him~ There is but one 
conclusion. He, Bullock, was not looking. By rea-
son of his failure to look, he did not discover Luke 
until it was too late." 
See also the language in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Wolfe: 
"And the evidence shows that not only was 
he not sure that another would not be in his way 
but that he never looked in time to determine how 
he should regulate his speed. Such driving through 
intersections is a constant occurrence. The law 
should pronounce it indisputably negligent." 
(Italics ours.) 
And as observed by Justice Wolfe in conclusion: 
"This rule encourages both drivers to be care-
ful· * * *" 
' 
The facts in the case of Sine v. Salt Lake Transpor-
tation Co., 147 Pac. (2d) 875, also closely parallel those 
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in the case at ba.r. In that case the plaintiff was a pas-
senger for hire in a t~~i cab owned and operated by the 
defendant. The cab was proceeding westerly on Sixth 
South Street in Salt Lake City, and was involved in a 
eollision 'vith another automobile at the intersection of 
3rd West Street. The intersection was not controlled 
by either a stop sign or a semaphore. The driver of the 
defendant's cab had a view of 200 feet to the south of the 
intersection when he was at a point 50 feet east of the 
intersection. K ot,vithstanding this fact, he failed to ob-
serve the approach of the other automobile from the south 
until he was ·within the intersection, at which time it was 
too late to avoid a collision. 
In a long and well considered opinion by District 
Judge Baker, it was held, as a matter of law, that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence which was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. While we dislike to burden 
the Court with lengthy quotations, we feel that the fol-
lowing language from the opinion of Judge Baker is 
pertinent and we therefore take the liberty of quoting 
rather copiously: 
"One of the fundamental duties which defend-
ant Butcher owed to his passenger, the plaintiff, 
was to keep a vigilant lookout for other vehicles 
along the highway upon which he was traveling. 
As he approached the intersection where the acci-
dent occurred, he was bound to anticipa.te the 
presence of other vehicles that might be crossing 
his line of travel, and to govern his conduct ac-
cordingly. 42 C.J. 91, Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cab-
inet & Builders Finish Co., R.I., 193 A. 622; Rich-
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ards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 P. 
439. Among other things it was his duty as he 
approached the intersection to look in both direc-
tions along the intersecting street, and not merely 
in the direction from which vehicles having the 
right of way over him might be approaching. 
42 C.J. 963. The supreme rule of the road as to 
motorists at street intersections in cities is the 
rule of mutual forbearance. Ward v. Clark, 232 
N.Y. 195, 133 N.E. 443. The foregoing rules were 
particularly applicable to Butcher because he was 
the driver of a cab for hire. Butcher could not 
moreover, insist with impunity upon his right of 
way in the face of an apparent danger arising 
from the negligence of another approaching from 
the unfavored direction. If in such case he saw, 
or in the exercise of due care should have seen, 
the Hall car approaching at an excessive rate of 
speed or otherwise indicating that the right of 
way was probably not going to be yielded to him, 
he should have slowed down, or stopped or other-
wise have taken appropriate measures to avert 
a collision. Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law and Practice, Perm. Ed. vol. I, p. 494, § 682; 
Hogan v. Miller, 156 V a. 166, 157 S.E. 540; Shelton 
Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S.W. 2d 468; 
Petri v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 328 Pa. 396, 195 A. 
107. 
"Actual possession of the right of way, as 
opposed to a physical position of two vehicles 
with reference to the intersection which might 
under the statute confer it, presupposes that 
motorists entering the intersection have exercised 
due care, including that of keeping a proper look-
out. In the case of a taxi driver that means that 
he must keep such a lookout as will conduce to 
the safety of his passenger. The operator of a 
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taxirab may not place his passenger in a place 
of in1n1inent peril through his O\vn failure to keep 
the lookout \\~hirh the la\v requires of him, and 
then after a collision has orrurred absolve himself 
of negligence by asserting that, after all, he had 
the right of \Yay. Neither may he absolve himself 
by asserting that the collision was due solely 
to the fault of the other driver, if that fault 
might have been discovered, and its consequence 
avoided by the exercise of due care on his part. 
Hogan v. ~!iller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540. 
·~_.A_s \Ye have already indicated, Butcher was 
required not only to look for cars approaching or 
entering the intersection, but to look effectively, 
and 'vas charged with knowledge of all that a 
prudent and vigilant operator would have seen 
had he looked. 42 C.J. 911; Dembicer v. Paw-
tucket Cabinet & Builders Finish Co. supra; Hud-
dy Cyc. of Automobile Law, 9th Ed., Vol. 3-4, Sec. 
48. 
"* * * The facts as we view them have been 
recounted above. So far as the lookout kept by 
Butcher is concerned, they reveal that he did not 
look at all until he had entered the intersection 
and this despit-e the fact that his view south on 
Third West Street was clear and unobstructed for 
a distance of 200 feet from a point 50 feet east of 
the intersection of Sixth South Street, within 
which limits Hall was at all times visible to 
Butcher had he looked. * * * Certainly, in light of 
the fact that Butcher's view was unobstructed, it 
cannot reasonably be said that his observation of 
the Hall car was at the first opportunity, nor at a 
point which conduced to the protection of his pas-
senger. Bullock v. Luke, supra. At the time he 
first saw the Hall car approaching he had by his 
negligence placed himself and his passenger in a 
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position of peril from which he did not, and prob-
ably could not, extricate himself by the exercise 
of any degree of care. Therein Butcher was 
guilty of negligence. 
"It is to be observed that we are here con-
fronted with a situation where there was an entire 
failure of the operator of the cab to keep the look-····· 
out that was required of him. By his utter failure 
to look until a time when the accident had become 
unavoidable, Butcher deprived himself of the 
opportunity to do anything which might have 
avoided the collision. Had he looked sooner and 
in response to what such observation revealed 
attempted in some manner to have avoided a col-
lision then, perhaps, a question of fact would 
arise as to whether or not he had exercised that 
degree of care demanded by the circumstances 
and his relationship to the plaintiff. As the facts· 
present themselves, however, viewed in a light 
favoreble to the defendants, Butcher failed to 
look when he should. He kept no look-out such 
as would be effective for the due protection of his 
passenger. In so doing he failed to perform one 
of the essential duties he owed to his passenger, 
and therein was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law. Bullock v. Luke, supra; Block v. Peter-
son, 284 Mich. 88, 278 N. W. 77 4; Jacobsen v. 
O'Dette, 42 R.I. 44 7, 108 A. 653; Thibodeaux v. 
Star Checker ·cab Co., La. App., 143 So. 101.'' 
(Italics ours) . 
Chief Justice Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion 
agreeing both with Judge Baker and with the remarks 
of Mr. Justice McDonough. We quote below from the 
concurring opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe : 
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~~ \\: e n1ust not n1aneuver the la'v into such a 
position that 'Ye put on a driver using due care 
the duty to avoid the effect of another's negli-
gence. That 'Yould n1ake each driver an insurer 
against the effect of the other's actions. In this 
cnse the distinction is well preserved. Butcher 
did not exercise due care in relation to his fare. 
He failed to look when looking would have been 
effective. Had he looked at a point 50 feet back 
of the intersection or at least so far back of it as 
to permit him to conduct his driving in relation 
to the exigencies 'Yhich might arise out of the 
conduct of Hall, he might have slowed to a speed 
below 20 miles an hour. * * * We can say as a 
matter of law as we did in the Bullock case that 
entering an intersection without timely observa-
tion is negligence. But can we say as a matter 
of law that such negligence proximately caused 
the accident J? In order to do that we must be 
able to say that had Butcher looked sooner the 
degree of care toward his fare with which he 
was charged, he it ordinary or extraordinary, 
would in law demand that he act differently than 
he did in this case. While I am not without doubt 
in the matter I think we can say as a matter of 
law that had he sized things up ai a moment or 
two earlier he would, in view of his speed and 
the speed of Hall, have had to make different 
accommodations in order to discharge the duty 
he owed his fare. The failure to make such accom-
modations contributed to the accident and the 
failure to sooner look resulted in the failure to 
make the accommodations. Thus the chain be-
tween failure to look and the accident is estab-
lished as one of proximate cause." (Italics ours). 
Judge Larson also wrote a concurring opinion from 
which we quote as follows: 
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"It is the duty of every driver approaching 
an intersection to anticipate that other persons 
may be in, or about to enter. the intersection, and 
to govern his conduct accordingly. State v. Adam-
son, 101 Utah 534, 125 P. 2d 429; Richards v. 
Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 P. 439. 
And since he must anticipate that others may be 
approaching or entering the intersection it be-
comes his duty to look to both sides and ascertain 
that it is reasonably safe for him to enter and 
pass through the intersection, and he cannot be 
heard to say that he did not see that which he 
should have seen had he looked. * * * I conceive 
the rule of the Bullock case to be this : A driver 
approaching an intersection must anticipate that 
there may be other cars approaching the inter-
section and before entering the intersection must 
look both ways and note any vehicles near or 
approaching the intersection. If the position 
and speed of the other user of the highway is 
such that a reasonably prudent man would think 
he could cross in safety he may proooed through 
the intersection and will not be guilty of negli-
gence. But, if the conditions are such that a 
reasonably prudent driver would be apprehensive 
of danger in crossing through the intersection, 
then to do so would be negligence. This without 
regard to who has the right-of-way unless the-
intersection is one controlled by semaphore lights 
or other definite means of control of traffic, at the 
intersection. And one may not rely upon the right-
of-way or assume the other driver will stop unless 
the circumstances and l;>ehavior of the other driver 
are such that a reasonably prudent man would 
conclude that the other driver was going to stop 
and yield him the right-of-way. 
"* * * Butcher, driving west, approached the 
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intersection-"There there 'vas no traffic director, 
semaphore, or stop sign-at 20 miles per hour. 
Hall, driving the other rar was coming north 
toward the intersection, at 40 miles per hour. 
'"\7Jlen Butcher 'vas 50 feet from the intersection, 
he had an unobstructed view of the intersecting 
road to the south of him for 200 feet, had he looked 
in that direction. At that time, Hall would have 
been approximately 100 feet from the intersection 
-well within the field of vision-and traveling 
about 60 feet per second, or less than two seconds 
time from the intersection. Butcher was going 
about 30 feet per second, or less than two seconds 
time from the intersection. Had Butcher looked, 
as it \Vas his duty to do, he would have seen this 
very apparent danger. Since the record is silent 
as to Hall's behavior as he approached the inter-
section but he did not stop or slow down, we must 
assume that there would have been nothing in 
Hall's conduct to justify Butcher in concluding 
that Hall would stop and yield him the right of 
way***." · 
We quote also from the opinion of Mr. Justice 
l\fcDonough as follows : 
"I concur. The defendant's own testimony 
reveals that he did not look to the south along 
the intersecting highway before reaching a point 
where observation was ineffectual. The situation 
therefore, is the same as though he had driven 
heedlessly through the intersection without look-
ing at all. He drove his fare into a position of 
danger without having placed himself in a posi-
tion to determine whether he, under the statute 
defining the right of way, had the right to pro-
ceed; he negligently failed to inform himself of 
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the hazard presently encountered so as to exer-
cise that care toward his passenger which the .law 
enJOins. 
"S·uch situation differs from one where a 
driver, having performed the duty of observing, 
exercises a reasonable judgment as to the right 
of precedence and, absent evidence that his right 
was not going to be respected by the driver of 
another car, proceeds. Under such a state of facts, 
it is usually for the trier of fact to evaluate such 
driver's conduct; although, in some circumstances 
such driver would in my opinion be free from 
negligence as a matter of law." 
* * * * * 
"* * * That he might have avoided the acci-
dent by a slight acceleration of speed or by slow-
ing down, after becoming cognizant of the ap-
proach of the other car, is demonstrated by the 
physical facts. Had he made such choice under 
the exigency confronting him, his choice· of other 
than the most safe of the courses open to him, 
would not be negligence in law. But here his 
failure to observe, evaluate and act should in my 
opinion be held to be the cause of his vehicle 
being placed in the path of the other car." (Italics 
ours). 
Notwithstanding the fact that none of the members 
of the court concurred outright in the opinion of Judge 
Baker, all of them appear to agree quite fully with his 
views and we find no dissent therefrom. 
We believe that the decisions in the Bullock case 
and Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company are 
controlling of the case at bar and it is on these decisions 
which we rely for affirmance of the trial court. The facts 
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of this case distinguish it from the cases of Mart in vs. 
Sheffield, Hess vs. Robinson and Lou·der vs. Holley. 
In Hess vs. Robinson, the case was held to be for 
the jury because the plaintiff was entitled to assume 
that the defendant 'vould obey the stop sign and yield 
to the plaintiff. There was no stop sign at the inter-
section involved in the case at bar and hence the rule of 
Hess vs. Robi-nson would have no application here. 
In lJJartin vs. Slzeffield, the case was held to he for 
the jur~~ because there '""as a substantial dispute in the 
facts as to the speeds at which both of the cars were 
traveling and as to whether or not the defendant stopped 
before the collision. We are not confronted with any 
such difficulties in this case. The facts are substantially 
without dispute, and taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, the conclusion is irresistible 
that the plaintiff's failure timely to observe the defend-
ant's approaching automobile and to take steps to avert 
the collision was in fact a substantial contributing cause 
of the accident. 
In Lowder vs. Holley, the case was held to be for 
the jury because there was evidence which would war-
rant a finding that the defendant was at least 250 feet 
from the intersection at the time the plaintiff entered 
the intersection. No such finding is permissible under 
the evidence adduced in the case at bar. Assuming the 
defendant to have been traveling at the rate of 50 miles 
per hour, he would have been at a distance of less than 
200 feet from the intersection at a time when the plain-
tiff was 20 feet north of the intersection; and at the time 
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the plaintiff entered the intersection the defendant could 
not have been n1uch more than 100 feet east of the inter-
section. At the time the plaintiff entered the intersection 
he still had adequate time and space in which to halt his 
vehicle and to avoid the accident, and if the defendant 
were traveling at 50 miles per hour that would have been 
fair notice to the plaintiff that the defendant had no 
intention of yielding the right of way. 
We have carefully examined the cases of Hunter v. 
Michaelis, 198 Pac. (2d) 245, Mingus v. Olsson, 201 Pac. 
(2d) 495, Nielson v. Mauchley, 202 Pac. (2d) 547, Spack-
man v. Carson, 216 Pac. (2d) 640 and Compton v. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., 235 Pac. (2d) 515, all of which 
are cited in plaintiff's brief, and we do not see that any 
of them are sufficiently close in point of fact to be of 
any assistance to the court in determining the case at 
bar. 
Hunter v. Michaelis was a case involving a pedes-
trian being struck by an automobile. It was decided 
under the laws of the State of California and the court 
specifically observed that it expressed no opinion as to 
whether the case would be ruled the same under the law 
of Utah. Moreover, in that case the plaintiff not only 
looked before attempting to cross the street, but looked 
and reappraised the situation twice during the course 
of her traverse of the street. 
Mingus v. Olsson is likewise a pedestrian case. In 
that case a pedestrian was held guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matte-r of law in failing to observe and 
take heed of the defendant's app-roaching vehicle. In 
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so far as the principles of that case have any relation-
ship to the case at bar, it is favorable to the defendant 
and not to the plaintiff. 
The case of Nielson v. Ma1tchley is likewise different 
on its facts. In that case the plaintiff observed the de-
fendant's bus \vhen he was 300 feet away and he .con-
tinued to observe the bus and watch its movements dur-
ing the entire course of his travel toward the bus. He 
also made an appropriate reduction in his speed as he 
approached the bus. He was entitled to assume under 
the facts of that case that the bus would yield the right 
of way to him. When it became apparent that the bus 
would not yield it was too late for the plaintiff to avoid 
the accident. The case is entirely different on its facts 
and involves an entirely different question of law. 
The case of Spackman v. Carson is somewhat similar 
to Nielson v. Mauchley and bears no resemblance to the 
facts in the case at bar. There the plaintiff observed 
the defendant's vehicle parked along side the road as 
he proceeded toward it and when he was about 200 
feet away. There was nothing about the appearance of 
the vehicle which would indicate that it was about to 
move onto the road. Plaintiff next observed it when it 
was about 30 feet away and at that time it was moving 
on to the road in front of him. That is quite a different 
situation from a case where a car is observed or is 
observable approaching an intersection at a fairly rapid 
rate of speed. In such a case it can only be inferred 
that the driver of such an automobile intends to traverse 
the intersection and other drivers approaching the inter-
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section n1ust in the exercise of reasonable care pay heed 
to this fact. By express statement of the court, the hold-
ing of the Spackman case is limited strictly to its own 
facts. 
The case of Compton vs. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot 
Co. involved a pedestrian being struck by a train. She 
was held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law in failing to observe the approach of the train. 
If that case has any bearing on the case at bar, it sup-
ports the position of the defendant. 
The following quotation therefrom, has some per-
tinence to the facts in the case at bar : 
"It seems inescapable that the deceased was 
guilty of contributory negligence. It was her 
duty to look and listen for trains before going 
on the tracks. She had a clear view of the tracks 
to the north, well before she got far enough west 
to be in the path of a train. Under the evidence 
the engine was there to be seen. If decedent had 
looked at any time, either as she started, or as 
she pursued a course parallel to, but dangerously 
near the tracks, she must necessarily have seen 
the train approaching. She was therefore, either 
negligent in failing to look or in failing to heed 
the train if she saw it." 
The rule that both drivers involved in an intersec-
tion collision are guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law is a healthy rule and conforms to the realities of 
modern day driving conditions. In truth and in fact, 
under ordinary circumstances, it is possible for an 
intersection collision to occur only where both drivers 
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are guilty of some laxity. In the ordinary situation an 
intersection collision "\Yill not and cannot occur unless 
both of the drivers fail to see each other, or, having 
seen one another, attempt to \vin a race across an inter-
section. No prudent driver "\vill attempt to cross an 
intersection, even though technically entitled to the right 
of way, unless there is no driver approaching from the 
intersecting high,va.y so close as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard, or unless such approaching driver has 
clearly indicated an intention to yield the right of way. 
In the face of a rapidly mounting accident toU, result-
ing in the loss of 35,000 lives and physical injuries to 
one million persons annually, and property damage 
a1nounting to untold millions of dollars, a rule requiring 
both parties approaching an intersection to take the 
utmost precaution would seem to be a salutary prin-
ciple. It will be a most unusual factual situation where 
one driver involved in an intersection collision can say 
that he was blameless in the matter. Obstructions to 
vision would not ordinarily be any excuse. Where an 
intersection is blind the driver approaching should make 
an appropriate reduction in speed and even come to 
a complete stop if necessary before essaying to cross. 
As was so well said by the court in Conklin v. Walsh, 
193 Pac. (2d) 437, 439: 
"The duty to keep a proper lookout applies 
as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver. 
Neither driver can excuse his own failure to 
observe because the other driver failed in his 
duty. Neither driver is at any time to be excused 
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for want of vigilance or failure to see what is 
to be seen." 
We are fully mindful of the desirability that traffic 
should flow freely and with a minimum of delay, but 
we do not believe that a rule requiring careful and 
reasonable observations on the approach to, and entry 
of, intersections need necessarily to detract from this 
end. We are not so much concerned, in cases of this sort, 
with arterial highways, where traffic is regulated by 
semaphores and protected by stop signs. In those areas 
where intersections are not controlled by semaphores, 
stop signs, or other devices, traffic ordinarily is very 
light and will not be unduly burdened or delayed by a 
rule which requires careful observations at all inter-
sections. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court was correct and is 
In accordance with the rules and decisions heretofore 
laid down by this court and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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